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Abstract
Despite the vast success of Deep Neural Net-
works in numerous application domains, it has
been shown that such models are not robust i.e.,
they are vulnerable to small adversarial perturba-
tions of the input. While extensive work has been
done on why such perturbations occur or how to
successfully defend against them, we still do not
have a complete understanding of robustness. In
this work we investigate the connection between
robustness and simplicity. We find that simpler
classifiers, formed by reducing the number of out-
put classes, are less susceptible to adversarial per-
turbations. Consequently, we demonstrate that
decomposing a complex multiclass model into
an aggregation of binary models enhances robust-
ness. This behavior is consistent across different
datasets and model architectures and can be com-
bined with known defense techniques such as ad-
versarial training. Moreover, we provide further
evidence of a disconnect between standard and
robust learning regimes. In particular, we show
that elaborate label information can help standard
accuracy but harm robustness.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial
examples, human-imperceptible perturbations of the inputs
that are specifically crafted to fool the classifier (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015). This prevalent vul-
nerability is especially concerning as the usage of neural
networks in industrial applications increases and the need
for secure deep learning systems rapidly grows, e.g., in au-
tonomous driving, online content moderation and malware
detection (Athalye et al., 2017).
In response to this vulnerability, a large body of work has
been devoted to constructing robust deep learning systems.
While some progress has been made in understanding and
defending against adversarial examples, most attempts have
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Figure 1. Distribution of distance to decision boundary of test ex-
amples for a “simple” binary classifier (orange) and “complex”
multiclass classifier (blue). Smaller perturbations are sufficient to
fool the multiclass classifier. Both models are ResNet-18s trained
on CIFAR-10. (See Section 3 for details.)
fallen to powerful optimization-based attacks (Papernot
et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018). The most successful
and sustainable defense paradigm thus far is adversarial
training (Madry et al., 2017; Goodfellow et al., 2014) and
its variants (Ding et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Wang
et al., 2020). Since robustness could potentially be achieved
using various methods, a natural question is whether we can
design techniques complementary to adversarial training to
decrease the vulnerability of our models.
In this paper, we investigate this question by examining
robustness through the lens of simplicity. More specifically,
we consider the simplification of a classification task, or
model, through the reduction of the number of its output
classes. We then explore how the robust accuracy of the
model evolves as a function of task simplicity. The answer
is unclear as there are two opposing intuitions: On one hand,
tasks of lower complexity are easier to learn and therefore,
simpler classifiers might be more robust. On the other hand,
more classes or finer data labels provide more information
to the model, which might lead to better performance.
In this context, we find that models trained on simpler ob-
jectives are less susceptible to adversarial perturbations. To
measure robustness, we consider the distance between sam-
ples and decision boundaries for both binary and multiclass
models. Figure 1 compares the distributions of these dis-
tances and shows a significant reduction in perturbation size
when given a more complex classification task. Intuitively,
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this suggests that binary classifiers are more resilient to
adversarial perturbations than their multiclass counterparts.
The main obstacle is then how to leverage the observation
above to develop multiclass models that enjoy an improve-
ment in robustness.
Aggregation of Binary Classifiers. We propose an ag-
gregation of adversarially trained binary classifiers. We
measure the robustness of this model by crafting attacks
specifically for our architecture. Surprisingly, this straight-
forward aggregation yields a consistent increase in robust-
ness for the multiclass task when compared to the baseline
of a single multiclass model. Finally, to understand this
improvement, we analyze the correlation between the gra-
dients of binary classifiers in the aggregation. We find that
gradients are misaligned, making it difficult for an adversary
to find effective perturbations using gradient-based attacks.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
• We propose a new connection between robustness and
simplicity by showing that classifiers with fewer output
classes are less susceptible to adversarial perturbations.
• We show that aggregations of simple classifiers have
higher robust accuracy compared to multiclass models.
• We use gradient alignment analysis to understand the
robustness of the aggregation and find that adversarial
perturbations are not shared among its components.
• Of independent interest, we demonstrate a surprising
disconnect between learning a classifier for standard
classification and a classifier robust to adversarial per-
turbations. Specifically, additional information on the
dataset helps clean accuracy while harming robustness.
Related Work. There have been numerous approaches
proposed to defend against adversarial perturbations that
yield a deeper understanding of robustness, including de-
fensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016), gradient regu-
larization (Ross & Doshi-Velez, 2018), feature squeezing
(Xu et al., 2018) and model compression (Liu et al., 2019).
Moreover, Feinman et al. (2017); Pang et al. (2018); Ma
et al. (2018) focus on detecting adversarial noise. Another
line of defense strategies focuses on constructing ensembles
of multiclass models to improve robustness (Trame`r et al.,
2018). While the early work of He et al. (2017) provides
evidence that ensembles are, in general, not more robust
than their weaker components, recent work show promising
results by explicitly promoting diversity among individual
classifiers (Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019; Pang et al., 2019).
Paper Organization. In Section 2 we introduce prelim-
inary definitions and notation. In Section 3 we state and
experimentally support our main observation about the ro-
bustness of simpler classifiers, which serves as motivation
to introduce aggregations of binary classifiers in Section 4.
We show empirical results regarding the performance of bi-
nary aggregations across different settings in Section 5 and
provide intuition about the observed increase in accuracy
using gradient alignment analysis in Section 6. We conclude
with a discussion in Sections 7 and 8.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we define our notation and briefly describe
the adversarial attacks we use in our experiments.
2.1. The Adversarial Setting
Robust Optimization. In the robust optimization frame-
work of supervised learning the input examples x ∈ X and
corresponding labels y ∈ Y are generated from an unknown
distribution (x, y) ∼ D. For each natural input x, an adver-
sary attempts to find an adversarial example by crafting
noise ξ, so that the perturbed input x′ = x + ξ is close to x
but is misclassified by the model.
The goal of the learner is to output a classifier hθ : X → Y
that achieves low error on the adversarial distribution, i.e.
is robust. Here, θ denotes the weights of the model and we
will omit it when it is clear from context. Formally, we try
to minimize the loss over adversarial examples:
min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
max
x′
L(hθ(x′), y)
where L(h(x), y) is the cross-entropy loss. This optimiza-
tion paradigm is known as adversarial training and can be
viewed as data augmentation with adversarial examples.
Threat Model. In this paper we consider white-box at-
tacks where the adversary has full information about the
architecture, weights and train data of the model. The only
constraint is that the noise budget has bounded `p norm, en-
suring that the adversarial example x′ lies in close proximity
to the natural one. We consider both `2 and `∞ attacks.
An attack is targeted if the adversary crafts the perturbation
so that x′ will be classified as an instance of a specific class
while it is untargeted if it aims to change the prediction of
a model to any class other than the true class. We mostly
consider untargeted attacks which is a more general setting.
2.2. Attack Algorithms
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD was proposed
by Madry et al. (2017) as an improvement upon Iterative-
FGSM (Kurakin et al., 2016). It consists of two alternating
steps: a gradient step in the direction maximizing the loss
and a projection step constraining the distorted input to
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Figure 2. Visualizations of learned decision boundaries for (a) a binary classifier and (b) a multiclass classifier that are given the same test
time task but different train data labels. Robustness is measured using an untargeted adversary (see arrows) in (a) and (b). Robustness of
the multiclass model in (c) is measured only in the context of the teal decision boundary to compare performance to the binary case.
remain within the budget . Formally,
xk+1 = ΠB(xk + η∇xL(y, h(xk))
where B = {xk : ‖xk − x‖p ≤ }. We initiate x0 to be
a random point in the vicinity of x. As suggested in the
original paper, we normalize the gradient for p = 2 and use
the sign of the gradient when p =∞.
Carlini Wagner Attack (CW). As in Carlini & Wag-
ner (2017), we use a similar approach to PGD and define
x(ω) = 12 (tanh(ω) + 1) to avoid the projection step. Then,
we minimize ‖x(ω)−x‖+cf(x(ω)) to produce adversarial
examples. Here, f is a modified hinge loss and c is tuned
using binary search. While the core idea is the same for
both `2 and `∞ attacks, the implementation differs to ensure
tractable optimization.
3. Robustness from Simplicity
In this section, we investigate the relationship between ro-
bustness and model complexity by computing the average
perturbation needed for samples to cross the decision bound-
ary. Our main finding is that the robustness of a classifier
decreases with the complexity of the task it performs. We
first discuss a motivational example using Figure 2, which
shows learned decision boundaries of binary and multiclass
models, before moving to experimental results.
3.1. Motivational Example
We want to compare the performance of two classifiers that
are given the same task at test time: classify the presence
of a dog in the image. The two classifiers are adversarially
trained on the same data distribution, but differ solely on
the information they are given at train time: The first binary
classifier (Figure 2a) is given coarse labels, e.g., 1 if the
picture contains a dog (blue) and 0 if it contains a cat or an
airplane (red). The second, more complex classifier (Figure
2b) is given fine labels, e.g., 0 if the picture contains a
dog (blue), 1 if the picture contains a cat (red) and 2 if
the picture contains an airplane (green). Our goal is to
understand which model will be more robust at test time.
When measuring robustness, we would like to control for
varying complexity among models. Standard methods of
computing robustness are shown for a binary classifier (Fig-
ure 2a) and a multiclass classifier (Figure 2b), where sam-
ples can be perturbed to the nearest decision boundary using
untargeted attacks. Comparing these two figures shows that
the potential increase in robustness in the binary classifier
is purely gained from fewer decision boundaries. By only
considering the decision boundary between dogs and other
classes, we can compare the complex classifier to the binary
one (Figure 2c). That is, we only consider a perturbation
successful if either a dog is perturbed (untargeted attack) or
if a cat or airplane is perturbed to be a dog (targeted attack).
3.2. Empirical Results
Experimental Setup. We first explain how to construct
tasks of varying complexity. Assume we have a classifica-
tion task with k classes and we want to solve the binary one-
vs-all problem for class 1. For each j ∈ {2, ..., k}, define
OTHER[j] to be a superclass containing classes j, ..., k and
the corresponding MODEL[j] to be trained on the data with
labels {1, 2, 3, ..., j − 1, OTHER[j]}. Each MODEL[j] is
trained on exactly j distinct labels. We train a total of k − 1
models, {MODEL[j]}kj=2, where MODEL[2] is the binary
task and MODEL[k] is the full multiclass problem.
We measure robustness by considering a perturbation suc-
cessful if either an example in class 1 is perturbed to another
class in {2, ..., k} (untargeted attack) or an example in class
j ∈ {2, ..., k} is perturbed to class 1 (targeted attack).
We repeat this experiment 20 times on CIFAR-10 with ran-
dom permutations of class orderings to account for varying
difficulty of the chosen target class (e.g., cat is harder to
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Figure 3. It is more difficult to attack simpler classifiers. Each
line represents a different classifier trained over k classes. Clean
accuracy for all models is computed on the binary task. When
the permitted test budget is the same as the one we train on ( =
0.5), simpler classes have higher performance. The advantage in
robustness increases for higher values of . We report the mean
over 20 runs of ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 4. Difference in behavior between learning robust classi-
fiers (teal, left y-axis) and learning non-robust classifiers for stan-
dard classification (blue, right y-axis). In the adversarial setting,
increasing the number of output classes degrades performance
(computed for  = 1), as opposed to the standard setting where ac-
curacy slightly improves. We report mean and standard deviation
over 20 class orderings of CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18.
classify and easier to attack than airplane). We report the
mean robustness accuracy during test time across models
of fixed complexity for varying noise budgets  in Figure 3
and average perturbation sizes in Figure 1. We defer further
details on the training procedure to Appendix A.
Results. As seen in Figure 3, there is a significant de-
crease in robust accuracy as the number of classes increases.
Interestingly, reducing the number of output classes from 10
to 6 does not yield much robustness increase, but a further
reduction to 4 or 2 classes makes the model significantly
more robust. We note that even when the standard accuracy
of the simpler classifier is slightly lower, the model is able
to compensate with a gain in robustness.
3.3. Separation of Learning Regimes
We first discuss the nuances in our previous observations.
Then we address the qualitative difference in behaviors be-
tween standard and adversarial regimes. To measure stan-
dard accuracy, we repeat our experimental setup, but train
classifiers over clean examples. Similar to the robust regime,
at test time we evaluate all models on the binary task.
Conflicting Intuitions. At first glance, there are two con-
tradicting intuitions regarding the relationship between per-
formance and complexity. On one hand, a simple classifier
solves an easier task, i.e., if the complex classifier achieves
perfect accuracy on the fine labels it trivially reduces to per-
fect performance on the coarse labels. Moreover, a simple
classifier directly optimizes the test time objective. On the
other hand, a complex classifier is given access to additional
information on the data labels during training which could
potentially increase performance.
Standard vs Robust. Surprisingly, we observe different
trends in standard and robust regimes. While robust learning
coincides with our first intuition, as we previously discussed,
we find that standard learning coincides with our second
one. Specifically, the performance of the complex classifier
is comparable to the simpler one and even slightly improves
as a function of the number of output classes (Figure 4).
However, in the robust setting, we see that simpler classifiers
have a significant advantage over more complex ones.
We note that this disconnect between standard and adver-
sarial settings is a testimony to the fundamental differences
between the two problems. This is particularly intriguing as
the adversarial setting can simply be viewed as optimizing
a different (adversarial) loss function. Another such sepa-
ration can be seen in the generalization behavior: In both
settings, we can train models to have close to zero train error.
However, in standard supervised learning, DNNs are able to
generalize well with few examples while in the adversarial
setting, their generalization is marginal (Madry et al., 2017).
4. Robust Aggregation of Binary Classifiers
We now leverage results from Section 3 and combine simple
classifiers for multiclass prediction. We show that ROBIN
(RObust BINary Aggregation) achieves higher robustness
than models trained directly on the multiclass task.
4.1. Algorithm
We decompose the original multiclass classification task
into a set of one-vs-all binary tasks. Subsequently, we train
binary classifiers and aggregate their outputs to perform mul-
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Algorithm 1 RObust BINary Aggregation (ROBIN)
1: Input data, (X , Y), number of epochs T ,
step sizes ηt, ηˆ, attack budget .
2: k ← number of classes in Y
3: H ← {} (set of binary classifiers)
4: for i in (1, ..., k) do
5: Yi ← (1y1=i, ...1ym=i)
6: for t in (1, ..., T ) do
7: Generate adversarial example x′ using PGD with
attack budget  and step size ηˆ.
8: Update parameters θt
9: θt+1 = θt − ηt∇θtL(y, hθt(x′))
10: end for
11: Add hi = hθT to H
12: end for
13: return argmaxi∈|H|hi
ticlass prediction. We often refer to these binary classifiers
as arms of the aggregation. Algorithm 1 shows the general
procedure where the original classes are transformed into bi-
nary labels and k binary classifiers are adversarially trained.
The predicted class of ROBIN is chosen by the binary clas-
sifier with the highest prediction score. While one-vs-all
methods are a common approach (e.g., in SVMs), their
usage in the context of robustness is largely unexplored.
4.2. Attack Methods
While there are well-known attack methods for standalone
DNNs (as described in Section 2.2) as well as ensembles of
multiclass classifiers (Trame`r et al., 2018), these techniques
do not directly translate to attacks for ROBIN. In this section,
we discuss our most successful methods to attack ROBIN.
Additional methods are discussed in Appendix B.1. Any
of the following methods can employ any attack algorithm
(PGD, CW, etc.).
• BEST ARM. We construct an adversarial example
for each of the binary classifiers of the aggregation
and consider the attack successful if any one of the
constructed examples forces ROBIN to misclassify.
• TOP 2. We attack the arms with the highest and the
second-highest prediction scores simultaneously. We
aim to decrease the score of the highest arm while
increasing the score of the second highest one. For a
gradient-based attack, this is achieved by stepping in
the direction of the average of their gradients.
• SOFTMAX. For this attack, we view the aggregation as
a single multiclass model by adding a SOFTMAX layer
over the predictions of the different binary classifiers.
Since SOFTMAX is a continuous and differentiable
relaxation of our prediction function, arg max, this
modification provides a tractable way to attack ROBIN
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Figure 5. Performance of three attacks on ROBIN and standard
attack on the multiclass. Across all budgets, BEST ARM and
SOFTMAX have comparable performance while TOP 2 is weaker.
At the test budget of  = 0.5, ROBIN has improved robustness
over multiclass for all three attacks.
with gradient-based methods. This addresses the issue
of obfuscated gradients (Athalye et al., 2018), showing
that the increase in robustness is not caused by the
difficulty in computing gradients.
We also consider both targeted and untargeted attacks trans-
ferred from the multiclass model. We find that crafting ad-
versarial examples with the multiclass model as a surrogate
is an ineffective attack. See more details in Appendix B.2.
In the following section, we use these attacks to evaluate the
robustness of binary aggregations and compare the results
to the analogous attacks on the single multiclass classifier.
5. Experiments
In each set of experiments, we train k binary classifiers and
a single multiclass classifier to compare the robustness be-
tween ROBIN and the standard multiclass model. We use
the same hyperparameters for both ROBIN and the multi-
class. We now provide a description of our experimental
setup. More details can be found in Appendix B.3.
Datasets and Models. We evaluate the robustness of our
models on the CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) and MNIST
(LeCun et al., 1998) datasets. For CIFAR-10 we use Myrtle
CNN (Page, 2018), ResNet-18 and ResNet-50 (He et al.,
2016), while on MNIST we use a 2-layer CNN, CNN-2.
Defense Methods. We train ROBIN and the multiclass
baseline using three different defense methods.
• Adversarial training. In most experiments we use
adversarial training, described in Section 2, to train the
binary classifiers and the baseline multiclass model.
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Table 1. Comparison of robust accuracy using different perturbation types between a standard multiclass classifier (MC) and ROBIN on
CIFAR-10 and MNIST for various architectures. The `2 noise budget allocated to the adversary (and used during training) is  = 0.5 for
CIFAR-10 and  = 2.0 for MNIST. The respective `∞ budgets are  = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 and  = 25/255 on MNIST.
Dataset Architecture Norm Clean PGD10 PGD20 CWMC ROBIN MC ROBIN MC ROBIN MC ROBIN
CIFAR-10
CNN `2 0.743 0.758 0.475 0.555 0.474 0.554 0.479 0.656
`∞ 0.633 0.585 0.306 0.338 0.303 0.336 0.435 0.507
ResNet-18 `2 0.890 0.869 0.617 0.636 0.615 0.635 0.653 0.696
`∞ 0.766 0.805 0.437 0.448 0.432 0.444 0.511 0.638
ResNet-50 `2 0.906 0.883 0.614 0.637 0.612 0.634 0.659 0.705
`∞ 0.807 0.847 0.444 0.461 0.439 0.447 0.620 0.614
MNIST CNN `2 0.981 0.975 0.730 0.747 0.712 0.731 0.904 0.934
`∞ 0.992 0.991 0.958 0.959 0.957 0.959 0.986 0.988
• TRADES. Recently, TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019)
improves upon adversarial training by using a surrogate
loss with an additional regularization term. Formally,
the objective is:
min
θ
E [L(hθ(x), y) + λKL(hθ(x), hθ(x′))]
where KL denotes the KL-divergence. The first term
corresponds to the natural loss and the second term
regularizes the classifier to stay constant around x.
• MART. In a recent paper, MART (Wang et al., 2020)
improves upon state-of-the-art robust accuracy by us-
ing a novel surrogate loss function. In particular, they
optimize the following objective:
min
θ
E
[
BCE(hθ(x), y)+
λKL(hθ(x), hθ(x′))(1− hθ(x)y)
]
where BCE is the Cross-Entropy loss with an addi-
tional margin term so that correct and misclassified
examples are handled differently during training.
We use default parameters of λ = 1 in our implementa-
tion of TRADES and MART. With additional fine-tuning,
performance for both could improve.
Training Procedure. We train all models with Stochas-
tic Gradient Descent (SGD), mini-batches of size 128 and
weight-decay of 5e-4. For CIFAR-10, we train for 80 epochs
for ResNet-18 and CNNs and 150 epochs for ResNet-50.
For MNIST, we train for 20 epochs. We use an initial learn-
ing rate of 0.1 for the first half of training and decrease
in magnitude for the remaining epochs except ResNet-50
where we decrease the learning rate every 50 epochs. For
adversarial training, we use a warm-up schedule to gradu-
ally increase the proportion of adversarial examples in each
batch, which is given by 1− 12 (1 + cos(pi × tT )) where t is
the current epoch and T is the total number of epochs. Ad-
versarial examples are generated using 10 PGD steps. For
CIFAR-10, we use random cropping with padding= 4 for
data-augmentation. Moreover, to account for class imbal-
ance in one-vs-all binary classifiers, we sample positive and
negative samples with similar rates. Details on the sampling
process are deferred in Appendix B.3.
Evaluation Procedure. We evaluate trained models on
clean samples for standard accuracy and adversarially-
perturbed samples for robust accuracy. The robustness at
test time is computed with the same perturbation budget we
used during training. We report the strongest of the three at-
tacks from Section 4.2 coupled with a base attack of PGD10,
PGD20 (10 and 20 steps of PGD, respectively) and CW as
the robustness of ROBIN. We use the same base attack to
evaluate the multiclass model.
5.1. Results
In Table 1 we present our experimental results for `2 and
`∞ with  budgets of 0.5 and 8/255 respectively. We report
the clean and robust accuracy for ResNet-18, ResNet-50
and Myrtle CNN for CIFAR-10 and CNN-2 for MNIST. In
Table 2 we report the results for TRADES and MART.
Additionally, in Figure 5, we show the behavior of the dif-
ferent attack methods presented in Section 4.2 as a function
of the noise budget  at test time.
Increase in Robustness. In our experiments, ROBIN con-
sistently outperforms the multiclass model in robustness
across different datasets, perturbation norms and model ar-
chitectures. For a given  budget, we see a 1-3% increase
in robustness using ROBIN for ResNets. The increase is
significantly larger for CNNs on CIFAR-10. Interestingly,
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Table 2. Comparison of clean and robust accuracy between multi-
class classifier/ROBIN for ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10. We trained
both models using TRADES or MART. `2 values correspond to
 = 0.5 and `∞ values correspond to  = 8/255.
Method Norm Clean PGD10
TRADES `2 87.1 / 86.0 63.0 / 64.9
`∞ 83.3 / 79.3 44.7 / 46.7
MART `2 84.1 / 85.3 62.7 / 63.0
`∞ 75.5 / 76.1 44.3 / 44.8
when a larger budget is used during test time compared to
training, ROBIN becomes increasingly more robust than the
multiclass (Figure 5 and Appendix B.1). In certain settings,
ROBIN outperforms the benchmark in clean accuracy.
Our results for TRADES and MART in Table 2 show that
we still improve upon the robustness of the multiclass model
when ROBIN and the benchmark are trained with these
methods. For TRADES, we see a consistent 2% increase
in robustness. For MART, we see a slight improvement
of 0.4% in robustness as well as an improvement in clean
accuracy over the benchmark.
As a corollary, we see that ROBIN is compatible with other
training procedures and can be combined with future de-
fense techniques. Furthermore, we note that TRADES and
MART have loss functions specifically designed for the
multiclass problem. We conjecture that a similar approach
of crafting a loss function that directly optimizes for the
binary problem can improve the results of ROBIN and leave
this as an open problem for future work.
Performance of Proposed Attacks. While we compute
the robustness of the standard model using one perturbation
type, we evaluate ROBIN by considering the strongest of
three different attacks discussed in Section 4.2. We find
that the SOFTMAX attack coupled with PGD is on average
the strongest attack, with BEST ARM achieving similar
performance (Figure 5).
Since SOFTMAX, a holistic attack on the composite clas-
sifier, is only marginally stronger than attacking a single
arm, we can infer that the adversary does not gain much
additional information when given access to multiple arms.
Adversarial perturbations that fool one arm have limited abil-
ity to fool the others. In the following section, we attempt
to formalize this claim by analyzing the gradient alignment
of different arms of ROBIN, providing motivation to further
explore similar techniques.
6. Gradient Alignment
In this section, we investigate the correlation between the
gradients of the different arms of ROBIN. Through this
analysis, we aim to provide an intuitive explanation for its
success over the standard multiclass classifier.
In particular, to force ROBIN to misclassify an example, the
adversary has to either completely manipulate one arm, or
partially manipulate (at least) two arms. As we established
earlier in Section 3, manipulating one arm may be strictly
harder than manipulating the multiclass model. On the other
hand, deceiving two (or more) classifiers requires finding
a distortion in the mutual adversarial space of two arms.
Since the two gradients of these arms point in the direction
of maximal loss for each individual classifier, we can use
gradient alignment analysis to check whether it is likely that
a direction is adversarial for both models.
6.1. Coherence of Gradients
Consider two models h0 and h1 and their respective gradi-
ents ∇L0 := ∇xL(h0(x), y) and ∇L1 := ∇xL(h1(x), y)
of the loss function with respect to the input x. Formally, the
gradient describes the direction in which the input x must be
perturbed to maximally increase the linear approximation of
the loss function around x. If h0 and h1 have gradients that
are aligned, their loss functions have positive correlation: a
perturbation that causes L0 to increase will also cause L1
to increase. This implies the two models share a common
adversarial direction (Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019). Thus,
from the perspective of the adversary, an aggregated model
with aligned gradients is much easier to attack than a model
with misaligned gradients.
We now formalize the measure of gradient alignment be-
tween two gradients using cosine similarity (CS):
CS(∇L0,∇L1)) = 〈∇L0,∇L1〉|∇L0| · |∇L1| .
To combine two models into a robust aggregation, ideally
the cosine similarity of their gradients is close to −1. Then,
the adversarial directions of the models are antiparallel and,
consequently, the common adversarial space is small. Sim-
ilarly, for k models we would like the gradient vector of
the arm corresponding to the true label to be misaligned
with the gradients of the rest k − 1 arms. Then, one cannot
significantly decrease the score of the correct arm while
simultaneously increasing the score of an incorrect one.
We define the gradient alignment across k models using
coherence (Tropp et al., 2006), which we compute by con-
sidering the cosine similarity between the gradient of the
binary classifier corresponding to the true label and the
gradients of all other arms. Formally,
coherence({∇xLi}ki=1) = max
j 6=yx
CS(∇xLyx ,∇xLj). (1)
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Figure 6. Distribution of the coherence of ROBIN (purple) and a multiclass ensemble (green), across different datasets and architectures
(CNN-2 on MNIST and Myrtle CNN, ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10). We compute the coherence of arms in ROBIN following Equation 1 for
each input. For the ensemble, we independently train 5 multiclass classifiers of the same architecture and compute the coherence over this
set of models. The coherence of ROBIN is consistently shifted towards lower values.
The coherence or maximum cosine similarity provides a
measure of gradient alignment for each input.
6.2. Coherence of ROBIN
In Figure 6, we plot the distribution of coherence over gra-
dients of ROBIN for each input and show that it is consis-
tently low (e.g., about 0.2 average coherence for ResNet-18
on CIFAR-10) across different architectures and datasets.
For reference, we also plot the coherence of a multiclass
ensemble—a set of 5 networks (10 gradient pairs) trained
independently, that collectively make predictions—and ob-
serve that the average coherence is much higher. Hence,
the adversarial directions of the arms are almost orthogonal,
and consequently, an adversary would be mostly unable to
significantly influence multiple arms.
As a result, attacking ROBIN with the SOFTMAX attack
(which attacks multiple arms simultaneously) is not signifi-
cantly more effective than attacking each arm individually
as in the BEST ARM attack. Additionally, we found that
the examples SOFTMAX successfully perturbs are mostly
the same as the examples successfully perturbed by BEST
ARM. For example for ResNet-18 in CIFAR-10 with `2
perturbations, BEST ARM manages to successfully perturb
3263 examples, while SOFTMAX 3641 examples. Out of
these, 3259 examples are common among the two attacks.
This provides further evidence to support the claim.
7. Discussion
We introduce a new notion of robustness from simplicity, i.e.,
models enjoy robust performance upon reduction in the num-
ber of classes. This contribution might be of independent
interest since many practical applications of classification
can be simplified by reducing the number of classes. For
example, an airport security service might want to screen
images for dangerous items. Instead of classifying hundreds
of different items, the task can be simplified to a binary clas-
sification task of detecting a hazardous item in the image.
Additionally, the robust setting stands in stark contrast with
the standard learning setting where adding more classes
can help learning by providing additional information about
the labels. This is particularly intriguing as we have yet to
understand the similarities and differences between standard
and robust settings, specifically why models successfully
generalize in the former and fail to do so in the latter.
On a different note, while our method improves robustness
over standard architectures, there is an increase in the num-
ber of model parameters, especially when the number of
classes is large. However, we note that solely increasing
the size of a model is usually insufficient to gain robustness.
For example, Table 1 shows that ResNet-18 has comparable
robustness to ResNet-50. Moreover, multiple works propose
ensembles of classifiers which increase the model capacity
similarly to ROBIN. However, the most successful ensem-
ble techniques use regularization that requires classifiers to
not be trained independently, making training intractable for
larger ensembles (Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019). We avoid
the scalability issue as the arms of ROBIN can be trained
independently and in parallel.
In addition to the one-vs-all decomposition, we tried other
aggregation techniques to investigate different decomposi-
tions of the output space. In particular, we reduced the mul-
ticlass problem into a compilation of one-vs-one classifiers
and into two-level hierarchical classifiers. Unfortunately,
the first approach suffered a large clean accuracy drop while
the second approach had poor robustness performance. De-
tails on these experiments can be found in Appendix C. We
leave more complex aggregations as an important avenue
for future work.
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8. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the connection between robust-
ness and simplicity and show an inverse relationship, i.e., it
is increasingly difficult to perturb an example when decreas-
ing the complexity of the classification task. Motivated by
this observation, we propose ROBIN—a binary classifier ag-
gregation method—to enhance robustness of state-of-the-art
methods. We show that this method outperforms the multi-
class benchmark in terms of robust generalization and has
comparable accuracy on clean images. Moreover, we show
that ROBIN is complementary to other training techniques
and can be combined to further boost robust accuracy.
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Robustness from Simple Classifiers
A. Experimental Details for Section 3.
We train all models on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-18. The
details below are similar to the experimental details from
Section 5. We use Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), mini-
batches of size 128 and weight-decay of 5e-4. We train for
80 epochs for ResNet-18 with an initial learning rate of 0.1
for the first half of training and decrease in magnitude for the
remaining epochs. All models are trained using adversarial
training with a warm-up schedule to gradually increase the
proportion of adversarial examples in each batch, which is
given by 1 − 12 (1 + cos(pi × t80 )) where t is the current
epoch. Adversarial examples are generated using 10 PGD
steps with an `2 norm budget of  = 0.5. Additionally, we
perform data augmentation, where we use random cropping
with padding= 4.
To evaluate robustness across models, we use the same noise
budget at test time as we used in training.
B. Supplementary Results for Section 5
B.1. Additional Attacks for ROBIN
In addition to the attacks mentioned in Section 4.2, we
considered the following three methods to attack ROBIN.
As before, they can be combined with attacks like PGD or
Carlini-Wagner.
• HIGHEST SCORE ARM. One of the most natural at-
tacks to consider is to use the entire noise budget on
the arm with the highest prediction score. This attack
will trivially be at most as strong as the BEST ARM
attack mentioned in Section 4.2.
• AVERAGE GRADIENT. We attack all arms simultane-
ously and take a step in the direction of the average of
their gradients. The goal of this attack is to decrease the
prediction score for the correct arm while increasing
the score of the rest of the arms.
• SOFTMAX TOP 2. This attack is a combination of the
TOP 2 and SOFTMAX attacks described in Section 4.2.
We attack the smooth approximation of the two arms
with the highest prediction scores by isolating these
two arms and applying a softmax layer on them.
In Table 3 we summarize the performance of the different
attack methods we consider for a ResNet-18 on CIFAR-
10. The model is adversarially trained using PGD10 with
 = 0.5 for `2 and  = 8/255 for `∞. A subset of this table
was presented in Figure 5 in Section 5.
As we argue in the main body of the paper, the SOFTMAX
attack, presented in Section 4.2, is the most successful one.
This is confirmed in Table 3 which highlights the strongest
attack in bold.
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Figure 7. Adverarial examples do not transfer successfully between
the multiclass model and ROBIN. The dotted line corresponds to
the robust accuracy of ROBIN based on the SOFTMAX attack and
is indicative of the lack of transferability.
B.2. Transferability from Multiclass
We investigate the transferability of adversarial examples
from the multiclass benchmark to ROBIN. One might expect
that since the two models are trained over the same dataset
to solve the same task, adversarial examples could transfer
between the two architectures. Then the multiclass could
be effectively used as a surrogate to craft black box attacks,
which has been shown be a successful technique.
However, we find that adversarial examples crafted for the
multiclass model do not transfer effectively to ROBIN, in-
dicating that similarity in architecture of the models might
be crucial, i.e. the similarity task or common train dataset is
not sufficient to guarantee high transferability.
We consider both targeted and untargeted transfer attacks.
For the untargeted case, we perform an untargeted attack
to the multiclass model and check whether the adversarial
example succeeds in fooling ROBIN. For the targeted case,
we first evaluate the predictions of ROBIN using the clean
example. Then, we perform a targeted attack on the mul-
ticlass model and choose the target label to be the second
highest arm (second largest prediction score) of ROBIN.
Theoretically, this would be the easiest label to attack.
The results of this experiment using ResNet-18 on CIFAR-
10 can be found in Table 4. The model is adversarially
trained using PGD10 with  = 0.5 for `2 and  = 8/255
for `∞. In Figure 7 we also provide an illustration of the
results for `2. For reference we also plot the actual robust
accuracy of the model that corresponds to the SOFTMAX at-
tack (dotted line). It is evident that the robust accuracy from
transfer-based attack is significantly higher than the actual
robustness of ROBIN, indicating that adversarial examples
from the multiclass do not transfer very efficiently.
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Table 3. Performance of different attacks on ROBIN for varying  at test time. SOFTMAX is consistently the strongest attack with BEST
ARM as a comparable attack in some settings.
ResNet-18 CIFAR-10
`2 radius Attacks (Train  = 0.5)
Te
st

BEST ARM TOP 2 SOFTMAX HIGHEST ARM AVG GRAD SOFTMAX TOP 2
 = 0.25 0.7811 0.7879 0.765 0.7901 0.7878 0.8169
 = 0.50 0.6738 0.6937 0.636 0.6978 0.6937 0.7081
 = 0.75 0.5319 0.5774 0.479 0.5824 0.5773 0.56
 = 1.00 0.3843 0.4633 0.3395 0.4539 0.4626 0.4275
`∞ radius Attacks (Train  = 8/255)
Te
st

BEST ARM TOP 2 SOFTMAX HIGHEST ARM AVG GRAD SOFTMAX TOP 2
 = 4/255 0.6481 0.6583 0.6395 0.6838 0.6677 0.7158
 = 6/255 0.558 0.5802 0.5454 0.6133 0.591 0.632
 = 8/255 0.4666 0.4991 0.4484 0.5319 0.5095 0.5436
 = 10/255 0.3742 0.4206 0.3588 0.4534 0.4302 0.4599
Table 4. Robust accuracy of ROBIN on adversarial examples trans-
ferred from the multiclass benchmark across varying  during test
time. For `2, the models are trained with  = 0.5 while for `∞,
models are trained with  = 8/255.
ResNet-18 CIFAR-10
Radius Untargeted Targeted
` 2
te
st
  = 0.25 0.8285 0.8517
 = 0.50 0.7759 0.8182
 = 0.75 0.7179 0.767
 = 1.00 0.6441 0.7037
` ∞
te
st
  = 4/255 0.7302 0.7819
 = 6/255 0.6838 0.7596
 = 8/255 0.6349 0.7261
 = 10/255 0.5787 0.6852
B.3. Sampling for Class Imbalance
To handle class imbalance while training binary classifiers
in ROBIN, we can downsample negative labels and upsam-
ple positive labels so that each training batch has an equal
number of positive and negative labels.
We find that overall, sampling improves the clean test accu-
racy of ROBIN while still improving robustness. Table 1 in
the main paper shows results from ROBIN using sampling
on CIFAR-10. On MNIST, ROBIN is trained without sam-
pling. In Tables 5 and 6 we show results for ROBIN without
and with sampling respectively, for a number of different
noise budgets during test time. Note that the clean accuracy
( = 0) of ROBIN improves with sampling especially for
higher train . However, in both cases, ROBIN still improves
upon the robustness of the benchmark when the test noise
budget is at least as large as the train budget.
C. Hierarchical Classifiers
A drawback of ROBIN (and of other multiclass reduction
methods such as one-vs-one) is that it requires training many
binary classifiers. One cannot help but wonder whether all
these classifiers are truly necessary for robustness. In an
alternative (but similar to ROBIN) approach we attempt to
decompose the multiclass classification task into simpler,
but more complex than binary, classification problems.
We train three multiclass models on CIFAR-10 that we ag-
gregate into one hierarchical classifier. The first model per-
forms a “first-stage” classification where we train a model to
predict coarse labels for the points in the dataset, for exam-
ple animals vs. objects in CIFAR-10. In the “second-stage”,
we predict fine labels using a second model to predict 6
categories of animals or a third model which differentiates
between 4 categories of objects. We aggregate the model,
where we first input the image into the first classifier to se-
lect the coarse label with the highest score before deciding
to feed the image into either the second or third classifier.
Generally, there are as many fine models as the number of
coarse labels and each of them is trained only on the sub-
set of the training set that contains points labeled with the
respective coarse label.
The question is whether such a model can give similar gains
in robustness as ROBIN. Because of the hierarchical struc-
ture, there are multiple approaches to attack such a model:
1. attack only the first stage model,
2. attack only the relevant second stage model,
3. attack the first stage model and if unsuccessful attack
the second stage model.
Again, each of these approaches needs to be coupled with a
base attack such as PGD.
We evaluate the robustness of a hierarchical model in com-
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Table 5. Comparison of robust accuracy between a standard multiclass classifier (MC) and ROBIN on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-18, where
ROBIN is trained without sampling. Performance across varying test time  budgets are included as well as the difference between
ROBIN and multiclass (Gap). Consistently ROBIN outperforms the multiclass when the  at test time equals the one used at train time.
For higher , ROBIN improves upon multiclass.
ResNet-18 CIFAR-10 without sampling
Train 
`2 radius  = 0.5  = 1.0
Te
st

MC ROBIN Gap MC ROBIN Gap
 = 0.0 0.9153 0.8972 -0.0181 0.8765 0.8359 -0.0406
 = 0.5 0.7498 0.7582 +0.0084 0.7714 0.7474 -0.024
 = 1.0 0.5057 0.5412 +0.0355 0.629 0.6323 +0.0033
 = 2.0 0.1236 0.1747 +0.0511 0.3151 0.3746 +0.0595
 = 3.0 0.0178 0.0308 +0.013 0.1176 0.1656 +0.048
`∞ radius  = 4/255  = 8/255
Te
st

MC ROBIN Gap MC ROBIN Gap
 = 0.0 0.8974 0.8656 -0.0318 0.7659 0.7597 -0.0062
 = 4/255 0.6209 0.6386 +0.0177 0.609 0.6202 +0.0112
 = 6/255 0.4328 0.4937 +0.0609 0.5408 0.5448 +0.004
 = 8/255 0.2784 0.353 +0.0747 0.4371 0.4651 +0.028
 = 10/255 0.1629 0.2324 +0.0695 0.3362 0.381 +0.0448
Table 6. Comparison of robust accuracy between a standard multiclass classifier (MC) and ROBIN on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-18, where
ROBIN is trained with sampling. Performance across varying test time  budgets are included as well as the difference between ROBIN
and multiclass (Gap). Consistently ROBIN outperforms the multiclass when the  at test time equals the one used at train time. For higher
, ROBIN improves upon multiclass.
ResNet-18 CIFAR-10 with sampling
Train 
`2 radius  = 0.5  = 1.0
Te
st

MC ROBIN Gap MC ROBIN Gap
 = 0.0 0.9153 0.9049 -0.0104 0.8902 0.8691 -0.0211
 = 0.5 0.7498 0.7719 +0.0221 0.7792 0.765 -0.0142
 = 1.0 0.5057 0.5648 +0.0591 0.6168 0.6359 +0.0191
 = 2.0 0.1236 0.2109 +0.0873 0.2805 0.3395 +0.059
 = 3.0 0.0178 0.0399 +0.0222 0.0811 0.1446 +0.0635
`∞ radius  = 4/255  = 8/255
Te
st

MC ROBIN Gap MC ROBIN Gap
 = 0.0 0.8974 0.8736 -0.0238 0.7659 0.8053 +0.0394
 = 4/255 0.6209 0.6259 +0.005 0.6092 0.6395 +0.0303
 = 6/255 0.4328 0.4673 +0.0345 0.5404 0.5454 +0.005
 = 8/255 0.2784 0.3334 +0.055 0.4371 0.4484 +0.0113
 = 10/255 0.1629 0.2225 +0.0596 0.336 0.3588 +0.0228
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Figure 8. Left: “Animals vs. objects” partition in the first stage. The model is much more robust against attacks that target first stage.
Right: “First 5 vs. last 5” partition in the first stage. This partition is a difficult classification task and hence the model is not robust to
attacks on the first stage. Additionally, the total robustness is lower than the case where we have an easier partition in the first stage.
parison to that of a standard multiclass model. We use
ResNet-18 for the first and second stage as well as for the
multiclass benchmark. All of the models are adversarially
trained using PGD10 with `2 budget  = 0.5. We try two
different first stage splits, i.e. “animals vs. objects” and
“first 5 vs. last 5” and we present the results in Figure 8.
We find that even these simple attacks, which are not de-
signed to holistically attack the hierarchical model, but
rather target each component separately, are strong enough
attacks to push robustness below the robustness of the corre-
sponding multiclass benchmark.
Moreover, we find that the initial partition of the fine labels
into coarse ones is important and yields very different ro-
bustness results. Specifically, if classification in the first
stage is an easy task, e.g. as in the animals vs. objects
classification task in CIFAR-10, then we can achieve better
robustness results at this level. On the other hand if the
first stage classification task is difficult as in the case of first
5 vs. last 5 classes of CIFAR-10, then attacking the first
level could be more effective than attacking the models that
perform the final classification of finer labels.
Hence, there is no clear separation in the robustness between
the first and the second stage. The susceptibility to attacks
depends on the partition of fine labels that was selected.
